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1958] RECENT CASES
It should be noted that North Dakota has not passed on this question.
Since North Dakota has rules similar" to those in the main case, the prob-
len comes into sharp focus since it will undoubtedly arise eventually in our
own courts. It is submitted that the rule of the instant case expresses the
more logical view of construction, and that which North Dakota should
follow.
RALPH E. KOENIG.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw- PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY- CURFEW ORDI-
NANCE WHICH PaomBrrs MINoRs UNDER SEVENTEEN FROM BEING ON THE
-" srs DURINc CERTAIN RESTRICTED HOURS Is VoiD. - Appellant, aged 21,
was about to be prosecuted- under an ordinance which prohibited any person
from assisting-or encouraging minors under seventeen to violate a curfew or-
dinance.' Prohibition proceedings were initiated to prevent prosecution under
the allegedly unconstitutional curfew ordinance. 2 The court held that the
curfew ordinance was unconstitutional as an unlawful invasion of personal
rights and liberties. Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial District, 306
P.2d 601 (Cal. App. 1957).
Courts have repeatedly upheld legislation applicable to the protection and
welfare of minors, but there exists only a few legal precedents construing
curfew ordinances3 In 1.898 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 4 held un-
constitutional an ordinance enacted without express legislative authority. a
The court indicated that exceptions might arise which would necessitate the
minor's violation of the ordinance, and as stated in their opinion, "... so
numerous do they occur to us that they serve themselves to bring into
question the reasonability of the law."s
deposition, and requiring a showing of good cause in the instance of discovery of written
matters. This would be anomolous according to the view of the Brooks case. It should be
observed that the North Dakota Rules have no specific renuirement that good cause he
shown as a prerequisite-to discovery in either case. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 34(4).
11. N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b); N.D.R.Civ.P. 34(a).
1. The court did not allude to the fact that the minor was married and emanci-
pated from his parents' control.
2. Chico Municipal Code, 1 684 "Subdivision (a). It shall be unlawful for any
minor under the age of seventeen years of age to be in or on any public street, park,
square or any public, place between the hours of 10:00 o'clock P.M. and 5:00 o'clock
A. M. of the following day, except when and where said minor is accompanied by a
parent or legal guardian having the care and custody of said minor, or where the presence
of said minor in said place or places is connected with and required by, some legitimate
business, trade, profession or occupation in which said minor is engaged.
"Subdivision (b). Any person assisting, aiding, abetting or encouraging any minor
under the age of seventeen years to violate the provisions of Subdivision (a) hereof shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor . . ." (The court construed "business", in Subdivision (a),
as employment and not just any legitimate activity.).
3. See, e.g., People-v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945).
4. Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). The ordinance
prohibited all persons under 21 from being on the streets after 9 P.M. unless accompanied
by parents or guardian or unless such minor was in search of a physician.
5. North Dakota has no express provision which grantst the power to enact a cur-
few'ordinance. But see, N.D. Rev. Code § 40-0501 (1943).
6. Ex porte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). The McCarver
case cited several cases involving liberty of association and movement but it is sub-
mitted that since we now have several decisions construing curfew ordinances such an
analogy is no longer a sound one as minors constitute a class which is distinct from
adults. For curfew cases not necessarily pertaining to minors see, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320. U.S. 81 (1943) (Curfew for Japanese-Americans during World War
II held valid.); Clty of Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So. 2d 308 (1954)
(Ordinance which defined acting in a dangerous and suspicious manner included anyono
who is found on the streets after midnight without a satisfactory explanation held in-
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In 1945 a California court upheld a curfew ordinance which made it a
crime for any parent, guardian or other person having custody and control
of any minor under 18 years of age to permit such minor to "remain" or
"loiter" upon the streets or public places between the hours of 9 P. M. and
4 A. M.7 It is interesting to note that the above ordinance originally made it
a crime to allow a minor under 16 to "remain, stroll upon, use, loiter on or
be upon any street. . ." etc. -and that it was amended to read "remain" or
"loiter" so as to narrow its purview.
A perusal of curfew ordinances enacted in several of the larger cities in
North Dakota may serve to' illustrate both desirable and undesirable features
of such ordinances. One of the ordinances conspicuously fails to designate
the hour of the day at which the minor may again depart from his dwei-
ling.8 Some ordinances provide for exceptions for emergency -or necessity
situations' but others do not. 10 None of the ordinances studied apply if the
minor is in the presence of his parents or guardian," or if the minor is en-
gaged in a lawful trade or occupation. 12 In none of the ordinances examined
is an exception provided for a minor who is married or who is otherwise
emancipated from his parents.13
It is submitted that to satisfy both legal and practical considerations the
ordinance should provide exceptions if the minor is engaged in a lawful oc-
cupation, if be is on an emergency errand or one directed by his parents or
guardian,14 if the minor is married 1 or otherwise emancipated, or if he can
show reasonable cause as to why the ordinance should not apply. 1 The more
recent ordinances prohibit merely loitering in lieu of total exclusion.1 7 City
attorneys indicate that in most jurisdictions curfew ordinances may be justified
as an exercise of the police power; however, the ordinance must be both
reasonable and carefully drawn.' s
JOHN M. ORBAN.
CRIMINAL LAW - INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATION - SUFFICIENCY OF UNI-
FORM TRAFFIC TICKET AS AN INFORMATION. - Defendant was issued a uni-
form traffic ticket which required him to appear the following day before a
police justice. The defendant, on his plea of guilty, was convicted of operat-
ing a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals of New York
valid.); Mayor of Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 706 (1848) (Ordinance
to keep Negroes off the streets after 10 P.M. held invalid.).
7. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945).
8. See Grand Forks Revised Ordinances, c. IX, art. 1, (1948).
9. See Fargo Revised Ordinances, c. X, art. 1 (1952); Jamestown, ordinance 141, 1
1 (1953).
10. See Dickinson, ordinance 261, I 3 (1956); Grand Forks Revised Ordinances, c.
IX, art. 1 (1948). See also Bismarck, ordinance 476, § 1 (1935); Devils Lake, ordinance
359, 1 1 (1953)
11. Ibid; Fargo Revised Ordinances, c. X, art. 1 (1952); Jamestown, ordinance 141,
§ 1 (1953).
12. Dickinson is an exception. See ordinance 261, § 3 (1956).
13. Another facet of curfew ordinances but beyond the province of this case is the
culpability of parents or guardians if the minor violates the ordinance. Some ordinances
make the parent or guardian responsible whether they have knowledge of the violation or
not. Others employ what is considered to be the sounder approach, making the parents or
guardians responsible only if they knowingly permit the ordinance violation.
14. See American Municipal Association, Curfew Ordinances, p. 2 (1948).
15. See Florida Children's Commission, Reports on Curfew Laws (1956).
16. See Albert Lea, Minn., ordinance 1293, 1 1 (1955).
17. See American Municipal Association, Curfew Ordinances, p. 2. (1948).
18. See op. cit. supra., n. 18.
